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LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP.
V.
NETWORK SOLUTIONS, INC.
985 F.Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Lockheed Martin Corp. ("Lockheed"), filed suit against
Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI") alleging infringement, unfair
competition, dilution and contributory infringement under the
Lanham Act as a result of NSI's accepting registrations of Internet
domain names that were identical or similar to Lockheed's service
mark for "SKUNK WORKS."1 The U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California denied NSI's motion to dismiss for
failure to join domain name registrants as indispensable parties
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b).2 Subsequently, the
court denied Lockheed's motion to file a first amended complaint
adding a cause of action for contributory dilution on the basis of
futility, undue delay and prejudice? However, the court granted
NSI's motion for summary judgment on all of Lockheed's claims
in its entirety.4
FACTS
The Internet is an international "super network" which connects
millions of individual computers, networks, and supporting various
forms of communication, including the World Wide Web ("Web"),
1. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 1997 WL 721899
(C.D. Cal., Nov. 17, 1997).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
423
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electronic mail, bulletin board services and newsgroups.' All of
these forms of Internet communication depend on the use of
domain names to locate specific computers and networks on the
Internet.
6
The Web is an important medium of both commercial and non-
commercial communication.7 Information on the Web can be
presented on "pages" of graphics and text that contain "links" (aka
"hyperlinks") to other pages.' A link is an image or short section
of text referring to another document on the Web.9 The links
connect a set of data files ("website" or "site") or separate data
files located on other computer networks." A user interested in
accessing the referenced document selects the link, causing the
document to be displayed automatically, along with a new set of
links that the user may follow." Much of the Web's usefulness
derives from its use of links.12
While the linked structure of the Web is well-suited to allow
users to browse among many sites, it is poorly suited for users who
want to find a single Website directly. 3 If users do not know the
exact address of a Website, they must rely on "search engines."' 4
Search engines are available on the Web to search for key words or
phrases associated with a desired site. 5  Due to the massive
quantity of information on the Web, these searches often yield
thousands of possible Websites. 6 This cumbersome process is not
5. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 1997 WL 721899
(C.D. Cal., Nov. 17, 1997) at 2. See generally ACLU of Georgia v. Reno, 929
F. Supp. 824, 830-45 (E.D.Pa. 1996), aff d. --- U.S. --- , 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138
L.Ed.2d 874 (1997).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Lockheed, 1997 WL721899 at2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id.
15. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 3.
16. Id.
2
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helpful to businesses seeking to use the Web as a marketing tool. 17
Instead, businesses would prefer that customers simply be able to
find a Website directly using a corporate name, trademark or
service mark in the domain name. 8
Under a contract with the National Science Foundation, NSI is
the exclusive registrar of most Internet domain names, registering
approximately 100,000 Internet domain names per month. 9 NSI
performs two functions in the domain name system.2' First, it
screens domain name applications against its registry to prevent
repeated registrations of the same name.2' Second, it maintains a
directory which matches domain names with "Internet Protocol"
numbers of domain name servers.22 NSI does not make an
independent determination of an applicant's right to use a domain
name nor does NSI assign domain names.' In 1995, NSI
responded to the problem of conflicting claims to domain names
by instituting a domain name dispute policy. 24 Under this policy,
NSI requires applicants to represent and warrant that their use of a
particular domain name does not interfere with the intellectual
property rights of third parties.25 If a trademark holder presents
NSI with its trademark registration which corresponds to a domain
name, NSI will require the domain name user to prove that it has a
17. Id.
18. Id.; See also Panavision Int'l. L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D.
Cal. 1996).
19. Id.
20. Lockheed, 1997 WL 72199 at 4.
21. Id.
22. Id. The Internet Protocol numbering system gives each individual
computer or network a unique numerical address on the Internet. For the
convenience of Internet users, these individual resources are also given domain
names. Special servers maintain tables linking the Internet Protocol numbers to
corresponding domain names.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at4.
1998] 425
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pre-existing right to use the name.26 If the domain name holder
fails to do so, NSI will cancel its registration. 7
For over 50 years, Lockheed and its predecessors have operated
"Skunk Works," an aerospace development and production
facility.28 Lockheed owns the federally registered "SKUNK
WORKS" service mark for engineering, technical consulting and
advisory services with respect to designing, building, equipping,
and testing commercial and military aircraft and related
equipment.29 Lockheed did not apply to NSI for registration of the
name.
30
From 1994 to 1996, several Internet users registered domain
names with NCI using the words "skunk works" or phonetic
variations thereof, e.g., "skunkwerks. '31 In a letter dated May 7,
1996, Lockheed notified NSI that it owned the SKUNK WORKS
trademark.32 The letter requested that NSI cease registering
domain names that referred to or included the names "skunk
works" and "skunkworks," or otherwise infringed Lockheed's
mark.33 Lockheed also requested that NSI provide them with a list
of registered domain names that contain the words "skunk works"
or any variation thereof.34 In a subsequent letter dated June 18,
1996, Lockheed informed NSI that a domain name registrant had
agreed to stop using its "skunkworks.com" domain name and it
was suing another registrant in federal district court.35 In response,
NSI informed Lockheed that it could not provide a list of all
domain names that included "skunk works" or any variation
thereof, but that Lockheed could use the public "Whois" database
of domain name registrations to find this information.3 6  NSI
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1.
29. Id. at 5.
30. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 5.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 6.
35. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 6.
36. Id.
426
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further informed Lockheed that upon receipt of a file-stamped copy
of its complaint in district court, NSI would immediately deposit
the domain name in the registry of that court, maintaining the
status quo until the court ordered otherwise.37 Lockheed filed this
action on October 22, 1996.38
LEGAL ANALYSIS
In a summary judgment proceeding, the court addressed the
issue of whether NSI violated federal trademark law by accepting
registrations of Internet domain names that are identical or similar
to Lockheed's SKUNK WORKS service mark. 9  Although
summary judgement is disfavored in trademark cases because of
the inherently factual nature of such disputes, it is appropriate
where the party opposing the motion fails to demonstrate the
existence of any material issues of fact for trial.4"
Trademark Infringement
Lockheed asserted that NSI directly infringed upon its service
mark under the Lanham Act by accepting registrations of Internet
domain names that were identical or similar to SKUNK WORKS.41
To be liable under § 32 of the Act, a person must use the mark on
competing or related goods in a way that creates a likelihood of
37. Id.
38. Id. After Lockheed filed its suit, NSI continued to issue registrations of
domain names using variations of "skunk works." In December 1996, a Texas
resident registered the domain name "the-skunkwerks.com" with NSL and in
January 1997, a Canadian resident registered the domain name
"theskunkworks.com" with NSI. Id.
39. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 1.
40. Id. at 7 (citing Sykes Laboratory, Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849, 860
(C.D. Cal 1985)).
41. Id. at 1. See also Section 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
5
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confusion. 42  Before considering the likelihood of confusion,
however, the court has to determine whether NSI, by accepting
registrations, had used the SKUNK WORKS mark in connection
with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or services.43
The court reasoned that NSI's acceptance of domain name
registrations was connected only with the names' technical
function on the Internet to designate a set of computers.44 The
court held this represented the type of purely "nominative" or
"non-trademark" use of a mark not prohibited by trademark law.
45
Something more than the registration of a domain name is required
before the use of the domain name is infringing.46 The court
pointed to a New York district court decision which found
infringement when the defendant not only registered the domain
name "plannedparenthood.com," but also created a home page
promoting his book on abortion which used plaintiffs mark,
PLANNED PARENTHOOD, in its address. 47 The infiinging use
in that case was not, however, the registration of plaintiffs mark
with NSI.48 Instead, the court held the defendant infringed the
plaintiffs mark because it confused Internet users as to the source
of products offered in defendant's home page.49
The court also analogized cases dealing with domain names with
those dealing with vanity telephone numbers."0 The court noted
that domain names and vanity telephone numbers both allow one
machine to connect to another making it easier for customers to
42. Id. at 7 (citing AMf Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir.
1979)).
43. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 7 (citing Planned Parenthood Fed'n of
America, Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1434 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id.
47. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 8 (citing Planned Parenthood Fed'n of
America, Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
48. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood Fed'n of America, Inc. v. Bucci, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
49. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood Fed'n of America, Inc. v. Bucci, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
50. Id., at 9.
428
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find the trademark holder." An infringing act, however, does not
stem from the mere possession and use of the telephone number. 2
As with domain names, courts have held that the promotion of a
confusingly similar telephone number may be enjoined as
trademark infringement when the holder of the number promotes it
in a way that causes a likelihood of confusion. 3
By accepting registration of domain names containing the words
"skunk works," the court concluded that NSI was not using the
SKUNK WORKS mark in connection with the sale, distribution or
advertising of goods and services." Therefore, the court
determined it did not need to apply the test for likelihood of
confusion and held that NSI was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on the § 32 claim.5
Further, the court rejected Lockheed's claim that NSI infringed
its service mark as a "printer" of the mark under the Lanham Act. 6
The court reasoned that NSI's role is fundamentally dissimilar
from that of telephone directory publishers whose conduct has
been found enjoinable under this section of the Act.57 Unlike
telephone directory publishers, NSI is not a "printer or publisher"
of Websites or any other form of Internet "publication."58 NSI's
involvement does not extend beyond registration. 9 Therefore, the
court found NSI's liability could not be premised on an argument
that it prints or publishes the list of domain names.6" The court
held that NSI's liability, if it existed at all, would stem from the
51. Id.
52. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 9. See also Holiday Inns. Inc., v. 800
Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996).
53. Id. See also Dial-a-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675 (2nd
cir. 1989) and American Airlines, Inc. v. A 1800-A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N Corp., 622
F. Supp. 673 (N.D.Ill. 1985).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 10. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(A).
57. Id. See also Century 21 Real Estate Corp. of Northern Illinois v. R.M.
Post Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1614, 1617 (N.D.Ill. 1988).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 10.
1998] 429
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registrant's use of domain names in connection with other services
not provided by NSI.6' The court concluded that this type of
liability is more properly analyzed under the contributory liability
doctrine.62
Unfair Competition
As with most trademark infringement cases, Lockheed also
alleged a cause of action for unfair competition against NSI under
the Lanham Act.6' Lockheed argued that NSI engaged in unfair
competition in accepting registrations of Internet domain names
that were identical or similar to SKUNK WORKS. 64  Like
trademark infringement, a cause of action for unfair competition
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act depends on a demonstration of a
likelihood of confusion.6' Based on its analysis of Lockheed's
trademark infringement claim, the court likewise rejected the
unfair competition claim.66 NSI's acceptance of registrations for
domain names resembling SKUNK WORKS was not a use of the
mark in connection with goods or services which foreclosed an
analysis of likelihood of confusion.67
Trademark Dilution
Lockheed also asserted NSI directly diluted its service mark
under Lanham Act § 43(c) by accepting registrations of Internet
domain names that were identical or similar to SKUNK WORKS.
68
Unlike trademark infringement and unfair competition claims,
trademark dilution laws protect "famous" marks from certain
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. See also Section 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
64. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 11.
65. Id., at 10.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 11.
430
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unauthorized uses regardless of a showing of competition,
relatedness or likelihood of confusion.69 The Federal Trademark
Dilution Act entitles the owner of a famous mark to enjoin another
person's commercial use if such use begins after the mark has
become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark.7
0
The court reasoned that NSI's acceptance of domain name
registrations was not a "commercial use" within the meaning of the
Act, thereby rejecting Lockheed's argument that NSI engages in
commercial use because the registration of similar domain names
inhibits Lockheed's ability to use its mark as a domain name.71
The court interpreted Lockheed's argument as implying that any
conduct which makes it more difficult for Lockheed to establish a
presence on the Internet constitutes diluting conduct.72 The court
pointed to other cases where the fact that defendant's conduct
impeded plaintiffs use of its trademark as a domain name was not
the determining factor in finding the defendant's use diluting.73
The court further noted that the Internet is not an exclusive
medium of commerce.74 The non-commercial use of a domain
name that impedes a trademark owner's use of that domain name
does not constitute dilution.75 NSI's use of domain names is
connected to the names' technical function to designate Internet
computer addresses, not to the names' trademark function to
distinguish goods and services.76 The court found the fact that NSI
makes a profit from this technical function did not convert its
activity to trademark use.77 Moreover, although a domain name
which is easily deducible from a trademark makes it easier to use
69. Id.
70. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
71. Id.
72. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 11.
73. Id. See also Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1299
(C.D. Cal. 1996) and Intelmatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D.
Ill. 1995).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 11.
77. Id.
1998] 431
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on the Internet and, thus more valuable to its owner, the domain
name's correspondence to a trademark does not make the domain
name any more valuable to NSI.78 NSI's only interest in a domain
name is a pointer to an Internet Protocol number; it does not make
commercial use of domain names by trading on their value as
trademarks." Consequently, the court held, as a matter of law, that
NSI did not make commercial use of domain names as trademarks
and Lockheed could not prevail on its dilution claim.8"
Contributory Infringement
Lockheed further asserted that NSI was liable for contributory
infringement of the SKUNK WORKS mark because NSI accepted
registrations of domain names similar to the mark and refused to
cancel the registrations in response to Lockheed's demands."
Contributory infringement extends liability to manufacturers and
distributors who do not themselves use the mark in connection
with the sale of goods but who induce such use by supplying goods
to direct infringers.82 Under the doctrine, liability requires the
defendant to (1) intentionally induce another to infringe on a
trademark or (2) continue to supply a product knowing that the
recipient is using the product to engage in trademark
infringement.83 Since Lockheed had presented no evidence of
infringement inducement, the court set out to determine whether a
genuine issue existed as to whether NSI knew users were using the
domain names to engage in trademark infringement.84
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 12.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id., (citing Fonovisao Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th
Cir. 1996) (citing the test set forth in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives
Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 2188, 72 L.Ed.2d 606
(1982)).
84. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 12.
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The court reiterated that NSI is only involved in the registration
of domain names, not in the use of them in connection with goods
and services on the Internet."s Moreover, NSI does not provide the
other services needed to use a domain name in association with a
Website or other means of communication on the Internet.86 Those
services are provided by Internet service providers who provide the
host computers and connections necessary for communication on
the Internet.87 Users do not need to secure their own domain name
registrations in order to establish a presence on the Internet; they
can use the Internet service provider's domain name."8
The court reasoned that after a domain name is registered, NSI's
involvement is over." NSI is not part of the process of linking
domain names with potentially infringing resources such as
Websites.9" Further, NSI does not require holders to use domain
names for Websites or any other form of Internet communication
nor do domain name holders need NSI's permission to do so.9'
The court found that since NSI's involvement with potentially
infringing uses of domain names was remote, it was inappropriate
to extend contributory liability to NSI absent a showing that they
had unequivocable knowledge that a domain name was being used
to infringe a trademark.92
Lockheed contended that NSI received sufficient information on
its registration form to know whether a domain name registration
would be used to infringe a mark, and that the use of this form
85. Id., at 13.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 13.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 14. In view of this remoteness, the court
distinguished a line of cases Lockheed relied upon. In those cases, courts held
that the Inwood standard for contributory infringement should apply to flea
market operators who leased space to vendors. The flea market operators
directly controlled and monitored their premises whereas NSI neither controlled
nor monitors the Internet. Unlike the landlord of a flea market, NSI cannot
reasonably be expected to monitor the Internet. Id.
1998]
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satisfied the knowledge requirement of the Contributory
Infringement Doctrine.93 The court rejected Lockheed's argument
since the likelihood of confusion test, upon which infringement is
determined, examines the totality of the circumstances under which
a mark is used.94 The court reasoned the test's outcome could not
be predicted from an examination of the mark and the domain
name (as defined in the NSI form's brief statement of the purpose),
even if the domain name is identical to a mark and registered for
use in connection with a similar or identical purpose.95
Consequently, the court found that the receipt of a brief statement
of purpose does not give NSI sufficient information for the court to
impute knowledge of future infringing uses to NSI.96
The court supported its finding citing the numerous, legitimate,
non-infinging uses of the term "skunk works" provided by NSI.97
Accordingly, the existence of these uses illustrated the uncertainty
inherent in the question of whether NSI knew or had reason to
know of infringing use of domain name registrations.98 The court
further noted that trademark law permits multiple parties to use and
register the same mark for different classes of goods and services.99
The court held that the degree of uncertainty over infringing uses
of domain names makes it inappropriate to impose contributory
liability on NSI. °°
In holding that the degree of uncertainty over infringing uses of
domain names makes it inappropriate to impose contributory
liability on NSI, the court specified it was not making new
trademark rules for the Internet.' Lockheed's argument would
require the court to impute knowledge of infringement to NSI in
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing Eclipse Associates Ltd. v. Data General Corp., 894 F.2d 1114,
1117 (9th Cir. 1990)).
95. Id.
96. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 14.
97. Id., at 15.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 15.
101. Id., at 16.
12
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circumstances where the use of the term "skunk works" in a
domain name may or may not be infringing. ' Such an expansion
of contributory liability, the court reasoned, would give Lockheed
a right to gross control of all uses of "skunk works" in domain
names.
10 3
Lockheed's complaint also alleged contributory infringement in
connection with four specific registrations of domain names
similar to its SKUNK WORKS mark. °4  The court rejected
Lockheed's argument that NSI had knowledge as to these specific
registrants."0 ' Two of the four registrants never used their domain
name in connection with a Website or other form of Internet
communication which would create a likelihood of confusion."6
The other two registrants did use their domain names in a Website
and an electronic mail address respectively."7 Nonetheless, the
court reiterated NSI's lack of involvement with uses of domain
names in connection with Internet resources such as Websites and
electronic mail.' Consequently, the court could not impute
knowledge of potential infringement merely from the fact that such
uses occurred.'0 9 The court reasoned that NSI, as a domain name
registrar, had no affirmative duty to police the Internet in search of
potentially infringing uses of domain names."0  Further,
Lockheed's two demand letters did not notify NSI of any post-
registration uses of the domain names but merely asserted that the
names had been registered."' Consequently, the court held
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 15.
105. Id., at 17.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 17.
109. Id..
110. Id.
111. Id.
1998] 435
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Lockheed had failed to raise a triable issue as to NSI's knowledge
of infringing uses of its services.1
12
The court concluded that NSI, as the moving party for summary
judgment, met its burden of establishing the lack of evidence for
Lockheed's case."3  Lockheed's evidence would only have
established liability for contributory infringement if NSI had an
affirmative duty to police the Internet for infringing uses of
Lockheed's service mark.' 4 Lockheed's evidence did not show
that NSI was involved in infringing activity or that it knew or had
reason to know its services were being used to infiinge Lockheed's
service mark."5 The court found that knowledge of infringement
could not be imputed to NSI because of the inherent certainty of
trademark protection in domain names."6 Trademark law does not
give Lockheed the right to interfere with all uses of the term
"skunk works" by current domain name holders." 7 Consequently,
the court held that an extension of contributory liability in this case
would improperly broaden Lockheed's property rights in its
service mark." 8
CONCLUSION
The court granted summary judgment for NSI on the direct
infringement and unfair competition claims under the Lanham Act
because Lockheed could not establish that NSI had used its service
mark in connection with the goods or services or with the sale,
offer for sale, distribution or advertising of goods and services." 9
In the court's view, NSI's use of domain names was connected
112. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 17. The court also noted the parties had
not presented evidence regarding use on the Internet of three of the four domain
names registered since Lockheed filed its complaint. Id.
113. Id..
114. Id.
115. Id., at 18.
116. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 18.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id., at 19.
436
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with their technical function to designate computers on the
Internet, and not with their trademark function to identify the
source of goods and services.12 The court also granted summary
judgment for NSI on the dilution claim since NSI's acceptance of
domain name registrations was not a commercial use within the
meaning of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.' As to the
contributory infringement claim, the court granted summary
judgment for NSI because it had demonstrated that Lockheed could
not establish that it knew or had reason to know its domain name
registration service was used to infringe Lockheed's mark.122
Finally, since summary judgment on these claims was based on
Lockheed's nonexistent legal right to control the domain name
registration process, there was no controversy between the parties
and the court granted NSI's motion for summary judgment as to
Lockheed's declaratory judgment cause of action.12 1 In the court's
view, the solution to current difficulties faced by trademark owners
on the Internet lies in technical innovation, not in attempts to assert
trademark rights over legitimate non-trademark uses of the Internet
which is an important, evolving means of communication today. 4
Margaret H. Domin
120. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 19.
121. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Lockheed, 1997 WL 721899 at 19.
1998] 437
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